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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
collateral estoppel would not be applied against the plaintiff since she
was not a party to the prior suit'37 and did not have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issues presented in that suit. The Court
remarked that this was the first time that a defendant had sought "to
apply the principle of collateral estoppel to a plaintiff who was not a
party to the prior litigation.' '138
Being a stranger to the previous suit, the plaintiff could not and
should not have been bound to the prior determination, since she would
thereby be deprived of her day in court. The Court of Appeals answered
the objection that the decedent's father might share in any recovery by
the plaintiff by pointing out that the statute139 which imputes to an
owner-non-operator the negligence of his driver in order to impose
liability to an injured third party does not impute the driver's negli-
gence to the owner when he attempts to recover his own damage.140
ATrpicLE 41- TRAIL BY A JURY
CPLR 4102: Conduct of parties held to constitute a waiver of the right
to a jury trial.
CPLR 4102 provides that a party may waive his right to a jury
trial by failing to make a demand in the note of issue or after service of
the note of issue, by failing to appear at trial, by filing a written waiver
with the clerk, or by oral waiver in court.'4 '
In Clark v. Garth,142 the Monroe County Court was presented with
an appeal from an Order of Reference granted by the City Court of
Rochester on February 23, 1970. The defendant appealed on the ground
that referral would deprive him of his right to a jury trial. The action,
commenced on September 4, 1968, involved a claim for $500, the bal-
ance due on a sale. The parties amassed a mountainous record as a
result of an escalation of statements, notices, affidavits, memoranda,
motions, and cross-motions. In addition to finding that the defendant
waived his right to a jury trial by joining an equitable counterclaim
137 See, e.g., Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744 (1933).
138 29 N.Y.2d at 48, 272 NXE.2d at 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 819-20.
139 N.Y. Vms. & TRAP. LAW § 388 (McKinney 1970).
140 29 N.Y.2d at 49, 272 N.E.2d at 325-26, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 821, citing Continental Auto
Lease Corp. v. Campbell, 19 N.Y.2d 350, 227 N.E.2d 28, 280 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1967), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JonN's L REv. 438, 460 (1968); Mills v. Gabriel, 284 N.Y.2d
755, 31 N.E.2d 512 (1940), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 438,
459 (1968).
141 A party may also waive his right to a jury trial by joining a claim not triable by
jury based on the same transaction with a claim triable by jury. See, e.g., Noto v. Headley,
21 App. Div. 2d 686, 250 N.Y.S.2d 503 (2d Dep't 1964). A waiver does not deprive the other
party of his right to a jury trial without his consent. CPIR. 4102 (c).
142 67 Misc. 2d 473, 323 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Monroe County Ct. 1971).
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based on the same transaction with other jury counterclaims, 43 the
court held that both parties, by their conduct in delaying disposition of
the issues through"an over-zealous adherence to procedural, prelimi-
nary detail,"' 44 waived the right to a jury trial.145
The parties amply demonstrated that they were not serious about
their right to a trial by jury. Instead, their general behavior evinced an
intention to waive this right -a waiver according to decisional law.
Ironically, the county court felt compelled to return the case to the city
court to determine whether it could dispose of the case without the use
of a referee. 46
ARTICLE 52- ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5222: Liability of the judgment creditor is not absolute.
Under the CPA, money judgments were enforceable by execution
or supplementary proceedings. 47 Consequently there were numerous
inconsistencies within each procedure and many money judgments
remained unsatisfied, or were satisfied only after extensive litigation
involving the expenditure of substantial amounts of time and money. 48
CPLR 5222 was introduced to eliminate these dual procedures and to
create a simple and consistent system for the enforcement of money
judgments. 49 The rule provides in part that
[a] judgment creditor who has specified personal property or debt
in a restraining notice shall be liable to the owner of the property
or the person to whom the debt is owed, if other than the judg-
ment debtor, for any damages sustained by reason of the restraint
. 150
While disposing of one problem, the statute created a new one. Is
the judgment creditor's liability absolute, or subject to a finding of
irresponsibility or bad faith? The civil court, in Stathopoulos v. Sea-
ways Shipping Corp.,'51 chose the latter approach.
143 Academy Street Realty Corp. v. Young, 25 App. Div. 2d 485, 266 N.Y.S.2d 906 (2d
Dep't 1966); Sue v. Homer, 15 App. Div. 2d 729, 223 N.Y.S.2d 231 (4th Dep't 1962); Liberty
Bank of Buffalo v. Lansing, 259 App. Div. 797, 18 N.Y.S.2d 311 (4th Dep't 1940); see also
7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 4102, supp. commentary at 41 (1970). Professor Seigal notes that in
such a situation a single fact-finder is required in order to preclude inconsistent determi-
nations.
144 67 Misc. 2d at 476, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
145 See, e.g., Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 11 N.Y.2d 367, 183 N.E.2d 754, 229
N.Y.S.2d 740 (1962).
146 67 Misc. 2d at 477, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
14712 NEW YoRK STANDARD CIVIL PRACTICE SERV. 60 (1963).
148 Id. 59.
149 9 CARMODY-WArr 2d 64:2, at 331 n.7 (1966).
150 CPLR 5222(b).
15166 Misc. 2d 607, 321 N.Y.S.2d 717 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
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